Showing posts with label Citigroup. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Citigroup. Show all posts

Monday, November 24, 2008

Citigroup deal could be template

Citibank N.A.Image via WikipediaCitigroup deal could be template for other banks: By Pallavi Gogoi, USA TODAY

NEW YORK — The latest bailout of Citigroup (C) helped soothe financial markets Monday and could serve as a model for other U.S. banks looking for help with their large portfolios of toxic assets.

The U.S. government late Sunday offered $20 billion for Citi preferred stock, on top of the $25 billion it has already given the bank. But this time, the government also said it will assume 90% of losses from Citi's $306 billion portfolio of loans related to bad mortgages if the losses exceed $29 billion, in return for another $7 billion in Citi preferred stock.

The news boosted Citi shares 58% to $5.95, helped lift other battered financial stocks and triggered a broad market rally Monday in which the Dow Jones industrials surged 397 points to 8443.

NEW YORK — The latest bailout of Citigroup (C) helped soothe financial markets Monday and could serve as a model for other U.S. banks looking for help with their large portfolios of toxic assets.

The U.S. government late Sunday offered $20 billion for Citi preferred stock, on top of the $25 billion it has already given the bank. But this time, the government also said it will assume 90% of losses from Citi's $306 billion portfolio of loans related to bad mortgages if the losses exceed $29 billion, in return for another $7 billion in Citi preferred stock.

The news boosted Citi shares 58% to $5.95, helped lift other battered financial stocks and triggered a broad market rally Monday in which the Dow Jones industrials surged 397 points to 8443.

Analysts say the backstop was essential to calm investors worried that the values of U.S. bank portfolios have been getting worse each passing month. "Persistent downward pressure on valuations of residential mortgage assets are being compounded by falling valuations of commercial real estate and other assets," says Brian Bethune at IHS Global Insight.

Any bank with similar toxic assets in their portfolio now has a chance to ask the government for similar cover. "Bank of America (BAC) can use this template to reduce the risk on Merrill's (MER) portfolio before they close the deal," says Cassandra Toroian, chief investment officer at Bell Rock Capital. BofA declined comment.

For the government, this is a way to stretch the fast-dwindling cash available from the $700 billion bailout fund. "It enables the government to leverage taxpayers' money better," says Keith Davis, financial analyst at Farr Miller & Washington. "This way, you can avoid buying up bad assets, and hopefully not have to bear losses unless the situation worsens."

For the banks, analysts say, this could calm investors by putting a floor on losses from the bad assets. Also, it's like an insurance policy, which the banks might never need to access, Bethune says.

This marked another reversal for the government, which two weeks ago said it would not take any action related to toxic assets, as it had planned, and instead would invest directly in the banks. That news sent financial stocks tumbling. Citi was especially hard hit, falling 60% to $3.77 last week, prompting the bank to ask for more federal help. Now, "If the investors start to go after Goldman (Sachs) (GS) or Morgan Stanley, (MS) you can see them, too, ask for similar government guarantees," Davis says. Goldman and Morgan declined comment.


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Thursday, September 18, 2008

JP Morgan

J.P. Morgan & Co.Image via WikipediaFortune cover story:

It was the second week of October 2006. William King, then J.P. Morgan's chief of securitized products, was vacationing in Rwanda, visiting remote coffee plantations he was helping to finance. One evening CEO Jamie Dimon tracked him down to fire a red alert. "Billy, I really want you to watch out for subprime!" Dimon's voice crackled over King's hotel phone. "We need to sell a lot of our positions. I've seen it before. This stuff could go up in smoke!"

A classic Dimon manic moment, the call is significant for two reasons. First, it marked the beginning of a remarkable strategic shift that helped J.P. Morgan, virtually alone among the big diversified banks, sidestep the worst of a historic credit crisis.


Dimon and his team are on top today because they took a daring stance at the height of the credit bubble. J.P. Morgan mostly exited the business of securitizing subprime mortgages when it was still booming, shunning now notorious instruments such as SIVs (structured investment vehicles) and CDOs (collateralized debt obligations). With the notable exception of Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan's main competitors - including Citigroup, UBS, and Merrill Lynch - ignored the danger signs and piled into those products in a feeding frenzy.
Remember the October 2006 "ditch subprime" call? What set Dimon off?

Every month, recall, Dimon reviews every aspect of the business in great detail ("Appendix 3" is not a joke). And in October 2006, during the regular monthly review of the retail bank's operations, the head of mortgage servicing said that late payments on subprime loans were rising at an alarming rate. Moreover, data showed that loans originated by competitors like First Franklin and American Home were performing three times worse than J.P. Morgan's subprime mortgages. "We concluded that underwriting standards were deteriorating across the industry," says Dimon.

But what about the CDO's the bank still held? Weren't they all AAA rated?

Yes, they were, but the price of credit default swaps on even AAA-rated CDO's told a different story:

Winters and Black [investment bank co-heads] saw that once they bought credit default swaps to hedge the AAA CDO paper J.P. Morgan would have to hold, the fees from creating CDOs would vanish. "We saw no profit, and lots of risk, in holding subprime paper on our balance sheet," says Winters.

The combined weight of that data triggered Dimon's call to King in Africa. "It was Jamie who saw all the pieces," says Winters.

Not only did Dimon instruct the bank to start selling its CDO's (including more than $12-billion subprime mortgages that JP Morgan had originated), he took action across the entire institution. Trading desks were ordered to dump loans on their books, and to stop making markets in subprime loans for customers. The private bank, that manages money for wealthy clients, started advising them to sell. The corporate treasury department started hedging and placing bets that credit spreads would widen (profiting by hundreds of millions of dollars when that turned out to be precisely the case).

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